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The proper starting point in thinking about American national interests with regard to Russia is the direct question: why Russia is important? How can Russia affect vital interests of America and the extent to which Russia should worry the United States? What place does Russia occupies in the hierarchy of American national interests? According to the conclusion contained in the report of the American national interest (2000), Russia is among the few countries whose actions can greatly affect the vital interests of America. Why? • First, Russia - this is a very big country, bringing together some strategically important regions. By virtue of its size and geographical location, it is a key player in Europe and the Middle East, Central, South and East Asia. Accordingly, Moscow could seriously alleviate or, conversely, to undermine U.S. efforts to address both immediate (in particular, the situation around North Korea and Iran) as well as longer-term (Iraq and Afghanistan) problems. In addition, Russia has the longest land border in the world with China - a rising great power that their actions can significantly affect both U.S. and Russian interests. The main point is that while Moscow has lost much of its former power after the Cold War, it still has a greater geopolitical clout than London or Paris. • Second, as the successor of the Soviet Union, Russia has relations with countries that remain out of reach for the American government, whether in the Middle East, Central Asia or other regions. In Russia, well aware of what is happening in these states. Russian intelligence and / or Russian leverage in these areas could significantly assist America in opposition to the current, emerging and not yet manifested strategic challenges, including the war on terrorism. • Third, today as in the foreseeable future, nuclear weapons Russia can inflict enormous damage to the United States. Fortunately, the probability of these scenarios has fallen sharply since the Cold War. Yet today, as well as in the very distant future, the continued vital U.S. interest will lie in the fact that this weapon was not used against America or our allies. • Fourth, from the Russian side needed a reliable control of the world's largest arsenal of nuclear warheads and the stock of radioactive materials suitable for nuclear weapons. This is necessary to combat the threat posed by "stray radioactive materials." The implementation of effective programs to Russia to prevent the theft of these weapons by criminals, terrorists and selling it later against the Americans is in U.S. interests. • Fifth, the Russian stock, technology and knowledge of the biological and chemical weapons make cooperation with Moscow is extremely important to the United States that seek to prevent the spread of these weapons. In addition, cooperation with Russia can prevent a hostile U.S. States to get advanced conventional weapon systems, such as rockets and submarines. • The sixth reason is that, being the largest producer and exporter of hydrocarbons (oil and gas) in the world, Russia provides an opportunity to diversify America and build up reserves of energy or energy neblizhnevostochnyh, which are produced by non-OPEC countries. • And finally, the seventh cause: a permanent member of UN Security Council, have veto power, Russia can significantly facilitate or complicate U.S. efforts to work through the UN and other international institutions to advance its other critical interests. At a time when many in the world is concerned about America's use of his power, cooperation with Russia may actually contribute to the success of U.S. efforts to achieve global leadership. In a broader sense, the close ties between the U.S. and Russia can become a deterrent to other states, which in this case can not be regarded Moscow as a potential source of political support. [...] Why Russia is opposed by the United States Russia has not only refused to support U.S. policy in Iraq, but actively opposed it. Although we believe that Moscow has made a gross strategic blunder in this matter, he also was the result of missteps in American policy toward Russia. [...] Moscow's position on Iraq was not objectively predetermined: in fact, initially inclined to believe the Kremlin is to tacitly agree with U.S. plans for Iraq. Russian officials have learned from the events of 1999, when the vain resistance of Boris Yeltsin's plans to launch air strikes against Serbia only highlighted the weakness of Moscow, and the fact that the UN (in which Russia could play a key role) was pushed to the periphery of the political process due to utmost concern to the European situation in Kosovo. To avoid this negative outcome of debates over Iraq, Putin's administration for some time been ready to soberly compare their concerns about the use of American forces at risk isolating themselves from the U.S. and seriously damage changing for the better relations with Washington and not stopping the war with . However, the tightening of the Russian position and Moscow's decision to go for confrontation with the United States was a serious miscalculation not only the Kremlin. Partly it was due to three errors in American politics. The first of these was the failure to aggressively pursue the location of Russia. It seems that American officials had excessive optimism about the fact that they are easily able to obtain the consent of Russia: firstly, because of the improving bilateral relations, and secondly, because of the close personal relationship between Presidents Bush and Putin. For this reason, the White House has spent enough effort to find a formula to avoid active opposition to U.S. policy on the part of Russia. And in Moscow there were several signals that such a formula would have any chance of success if the diplomats approached the issue more creatively, and have paid her more attention. Apparently, U.S. officials have spent much less time in meetings and telephone talks with their Russian counterparts than to communicate with the leaders of France and Germany. This made it easier for Paris and Berlin are actively Kremlin bowed to his side. A second problem was too slow deepening of US-Russian relations. The returns, which Russia has received from this process was insufficient to Moscow was positive with special benefits America. In fact, the Russian foreign policy establishment is growing discontent "sidedness" of US-Russian relations. Russian foreign policy community has responded to the painful half-hearted consent of the Kremlin with the expansion of NATO, the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty and the establishment of U.S. military bases in former Soviet Central Asian republics. Although the notorious Jackson - Vanik amendment has minimal impact on bilateral trade, its very existence was in the eyes of Russians symbol of how little the White House is ready to do for Russia. Patient attitude to Russia's complex - resentment and suspicion, which is a relic of the Cold War and due to a sharp weakening of the relative and absolute power of Russia - is the need of American politics. Russian complexes with respect to the United States may view a variety of ways to distort the actions of America in Moscow, and they should be treated with understanding, if the U.S. wants to interact more effectively with Russia. But America should not try to solve this problem with the concessions that could harm our interests. Such concessions are not only prevented the U.S. would achieve its goals, but, in contrast, would have consolidated some of the Russian systems, creating the false impression that Moscow has some leverage over Washington. The inability to adequately treat these complexes contributed to strengthening differences in views of America and Russia to "one-sidedness" of their relationship, reinforcing distrust the intentions of the United States last. In carrying out policy toward Russia should be America also understand that the Russian leaders and elites share the concerns of other countries about the fact that the extent of American power is much superior to the other actors in world politics. Russia is concerned that the United States are accountable only to the leaders and voters, in regard to some important aspects of the use of "soft" power in the economic and cultural spheres, they are not accountable to anyone at all. These concerns need to listen, they must be understood and possibly remedied. To this end, efforts should be directed to the fact that the international community to seek legitimacy for our actions. If necessary, we must directly and clearly, giving the most convincing arguments to explain why our interests are so important that they require unilateral action. Ultimately, however, the U.S. must help the Russian understand that the development of fruitful relations with the United States they will have to get rid of their complexes (and abandon some of the claims). Many of the Russian elite has priznayuЂt that is unrealistic to expect symmetry in the relationship are no longer symmetrical. A third weakness in the Bush administration's policy toward Russia - the inability to set priorities, rather, consistently implement them. In establishing the hierarchy of American interests in relations with Moscow, the Bush administration has made more successful than the Clinton team, she also manages to more effectively follow the hierarchy. However, American officials often continue to operate to the detriment of their interests. One example of wrong priorities identified is the excessive support by the State Department multilateral regional organization GUUAM, which includes Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova. Even when a White House seeks to establish a strategic partnership with Moscow, the State Department urges disgruntled members of the GUUAM (originally association was created to counter Russia) not to leave the organization and provides substantial financial assistance. It is one thing - support the efforts of governments - to create GUUAM regional organization, and quite another - forcing some governments to remain members of this organization, which, in their opinion, does not serve the interests of their countries. Such tactics inevitably irritated Russian officials and forces them to worry about U.S. intentions with respect to countries - former republics of the Soviet Union, while at the same time, it almost does not give anything in return the United States. American interest in GUUAM due to concern about the pipeline, laid in a region where at present there is a rapid event. Similarly, despite the efforts made by Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze (the report was written before 23 November 2003, when Shevardnadze resigned. - Ed.), The United States should not allow themselves to draw the Georgian-Russian debate over Abkhazia. Moscow's official position on this issue, recently announced by President Putin, is reduced to what Russia calls for Georgia's territorial integrity and protect the rights of Abkhazians in this country. However, the Abkhazians did not want to remain part of Georgia. This is a very complicated and sensitive issue, and Washington should declare the obvious: that he stands for peaceful resolution of the dispute, which can reduce the tension in the region. You have to be careful not to make further steps, unless circumstances change. It must be understood and Russian priorities. Obviously, for Moscow's most important oil contracts in Iraq and nuclear cooperation with Iran. Still, the greatest concern to Russia former Soviet space - in particular, Ukraine (her very close historical ties with Russia, and, moreover, is home to most large Russian minority), as well as unstable new states of Transcaucasia and Central Asia. Susceptibility of Russia to everything going on in these countries, partly because of its nostalgia, but it's important and what bChlshaya of these regions directly bordering with Russia. The United States must be prepared, if necessary, do in this part of the world all that is necessary to protect vital American interests, regardless of the position of Russia. However, one can hardly recognize the vital U.S. interest in the existence or dissolution of an organization such as GUUAM. Attempts to keep this organization in spite of the obvious will of some of its members causes damage to the US-Russian relations. These efforts can be detrimental to U.S. interests more important - in part because they consolidate the worst instincts of some representatives of the Russian armed forces and security agencies, on which depends in part on the successful cooperation. Russian officials themselves say that the irritation caused by these and other U.S. actions in the immediate vicinity of the southern borders of Russia, weakened their desire to support Washington's policy in Iraq. [...] American political strategists have systematically underestimated the impact that the presence and actions of the U.S. in countries bordering Russia have both on the formation of Russian ideas about power and to the United States and the credibility of Russia to America. U.S. behavior in the region, promotes awareness of its role as Russia as a regional power. Support for the independence and integrity of the countries - former republics of the Soviet Union is important, but Washington should not create a false impression that its purpose - to encircle Russia from all sides, or limit its ability to provide a legitimate influence in the region to achieve a justifiable purpose. Really need to regulate the interests, intentions and actions of the U.S. post-Soviet space, and clearly explains to what they are. We need to better explain why the military operations in Central Asia eliminate the terrorist threat, benefiting both Russia and around the world. Finally, we need a more convincing form to repeat the statement made earlier that Russia threatening a permanent military presence in this region is not our goal. Economic cooperation Development of US-Russian economic cooperation should feature prominently in the agenda of relations between the U.S. and Russia. If U.S. officials want Moscow to be serious about the obligations of the United States, President Bush must first solve the problem of restrictions under the Jackson - Vanik Amendment. Russian officials claim that the amendment would adversely affect political relations between both countries and on the atmosphere of bilateral economic talks. Clinton administration and Bush has repeatedly promised Russia to take decisive steps in this direction, but no action was taken. In fact, the U.S. is still trying to use the Jackson - Vanik as leverage in negotiations with Russia on other issues. What has been promised, should not be linked with other issues. President, the Minister of Trade and other senior officials should personally make efforts to develop bilateral trade with Russia, including activating the exchange of trade delegations to the highest level.

The U.S. should continue to support Russia's accession to the WTO, although at this stage, the problem primarily lies in how Russia meets certain criteria. At the same time the Bush administration should put pressure on the Russian government and implement the necessary measures in the United States, in order to better provide for both countries of mutual and equitable access to markets. Given that Russia would cooperate in the reconstruction of Iraq, the United States needs to encourage the emerging Iraqi government take kindly to those oil contracts with Russia, which do not contravene international law and beneficial to Iraq.